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Abstract
We study party formation in a general model of collective decision-making, mod-
elling parties as agglomerations of policy positions championed by decision-makers.
We show that in the presence of economies of party size and a one-dimensional policy
space, players agglomerate into exactly two parties. This result does not depend on the
magnitude of the economies of party size or sensitively on the nature of the individu-
als’ preferences. Our analysis encompasses several models, including decision-making
in committees with costly participation and representative democracy in which the leg-
islature is elected by citizens, for a wide range of electoral systems including plurality
voting and proportional representation. The result implies that a multiplicity of parties
hinges on the presence of more than one signiﬁcant political issue or of diseconomies
of party size.
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Many societies make collective decisions in legislative assemblies in which the policies chosen
are compromises that depend on the policies championed by the legislators. In these assem-
blies, legislators tend to be grouped into “parties”. What determines the number of parties
and the positions they take?
A much-studied claim, known as Duverger’s Law, is that the number of parties is inﬂu-
enced by the electoral system. Duverger (1954, Book II, Ch. I) argues that evidence sug-
gests that “the simple-majority single-ballot system favours the two-party system” (p. 217),
whereas “the simple-majority system with second ballot and proportional representation
favour multi-partism” (p. 239). Over the last two decades several researchers have studied
the ﬁrst prediction, that plurality voting results in a two party system, in game-theoretic
models of collective decision making. In these models, this prediction follows from the strate-
gic interaction of the individuals involved in the political process.
An example is Feddersen’s (1992) voting model. In the Nash equilibrium outcome of this
game, voters agglomerate into two equal sized groups, interpreted as parties. Voters who
care only about the outcome of the political process agglomerate into two groups for purely
strategic reasons. The members of each party may have very diﬀerent political preferences.
Each individual is not concerned by the motivations and political preferences of her party
colleagues, but rather uses her party as a strategic tool to achieve a desirable outcome. For
example, an individual with moderate preferences may be a member of a party at one extreme
to counterbalance a party at the opposite extreme. The key assumptions in Feddersen’s
model are plurality rule, the cost of participation for candidates, and the concavity of voters’
preferences.
We model parties as agglomerations of positions championed by legislators. A group
of legislators constitutes a party when all members support and vote for the same position
(“party discipline”). We study a general model that predicts that two parties will exist for a
wide range of political systems, including proportional representation and plurality voting,
and for general voter preferences. Our key assumptions are that there is a single political
issue (i.e. the policy space is one-dimensional) and economies of party size. An implication
of our result is that the existence of multiparty systems hinges on the presence of more than
one signiﬁcant political issue or of diseconomies of party size.
In societies in which an electoral process generates a set of legislators, the operating
cost of a party derives in part from an extra-parliamentary organization whose main role
is to rally support in elections. Economies of party size may exist because costs have a
1ﬁxed component. National advertising, for instance, is largely independent of the number of
legislators in a party and makes up a substantial fraction of a party’s operating cost. Further,
large parties get disproportionate public subsidies. The fact that campaign contributions
may depend on the strength of a candidate’s party also contribute to economies of party
size. Candidates belonging to large parties have many favors to sell and may attract more
campaign contributions than candidates belonging to small parties with potentially few favors
to sell. As Snyder (1990) points out, for instance, in the US Congress all committee and
subcommittee chairs are held by members of a majority party; chairpersons generally control
the agenda, so they potentially have disproportionately more favors to sell than members of
a minority party.
We assume that the policy enacted by a legislature is the outcome of voting. Each
legislator champions a position (commits to vote for it), and the policy enacted does not lose
to any other under majority rule pairwise voting. We assume further that political issues
can be arrayed from left to right on a one-dimensional spectrum, and that championing a
position entails voting according to single-peaked preferences centered on the position, so
that the policy enacted by the legislature is the median of the positions championed by
legislators.1
In our model, exactly two parties form. These parties are of equal or almost equal
size, and may be accompanied by at most two independents, whose positions are relatively
moderate (Section 4). The existence of two parties does not depend on the magnitude
of the economies of party size or sensitively on the nature of the individuals’ preferences.
The parties’ positions, however, are aﬀected by the character of costs. The analysis is
straightforward, although the proofs are delicate. One application is to committee decision-
making, where the main intuition is clear. In this application we fully characterize the
equilibria (Section 5). We use the general result also to study a more structured two-stage
model in which legislators are elected by citizens according to a mechanism that encompasses
both proportional representation and majority rule (Section 6). In this model, parties commit
to positions prior to the election; our two-party result is surprising, given the generality of
the mechanism for electing legislators.
1The median is, more generally, the only subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of any “binary agenda”
(a procedure in which the outcome is the result of a sequence of pairwise votes) in which the players use
weakly undominated strategies (see, for example, Miller 1995, Section 6.3).
2Some history
The evolution of Britain’s two-party system motivates our model well.2 Prior to the Great
Reform Act of 1832, the English parliament was partitioned into two loosely knit groups,
the reformist Whigs and the conservative Tories; little extra-parliamentary party machinery
existed. Most bills were local or personal, and party discipline was minimal.
In the unreformed electoral system of Hanoverian England, a member of the ´ elite faced
an essentially ﬁxed personal cost to joining parliament. The cost structure changed with
the reform acts of 1832, 1867, and 1884, which lead to the evolution of a solidly two-party
system—initially Conservative and Liberal, later Conservative and Labour. These reform
acts aﬀorded changes that played an important part in the development of modern political
parties. The reforms were, broadly, three-fold: the expansion of the franchise;3 the annual
compilation of a voter registry; and the adoption of simple plurality rule within the electoral
process.4
For our purposes, the most relevant consequence of these reforms is that they introduced
signiﬁcant economies of scale and meant that parliamentarians could reduce their costs by
supporting a party. First, the large increase in the size of the electorate and the introduction
of plurality rule meant that a candidate had to rally support to get into parliament. Second,
the introduction of a voter registry introduced clear administrative costs to rallying support—
costs that could be shared within a party. Indeed, by the 1880’s “most of the energies of
the party agents and the bulk of party election funds were devoted to ﬁlling the electoral
register with one set of supporters and stripping the same register of the opposing voters
through the Registration Courts” (Ball 1987, p. 20; see also p. 26).5
This evolution of a political party system was intra-parliamentary in the sense that
existing members of parliament grouped themselves into parties. By contrast, the later
emergence of the British Labour Party was extra-parliamentary: it resulted mainly from
the work of grass-root activists from the working class who were enfranchised by the 1918
Reform Act. Our model contributes to the explanation of both types of party formation.
2Our historical account draws on O’Gorman (1989) and Ball (1987). Cox (1987b) provides an alternative
analysis.
3The 1832 Act increased the electorate by almost 50%, that of 1867 increased it by 38% in counties and
13% in boroughs, that of 1884 increased it by 66%, and that of 1918 (which enfranchised all women over 30)
increased it by around 50% (Ball 1987, pp. 18, 24).
4In 1866, prior to the reforms of 1867, half the members of the House of Commons were elected by one
ﬁfth of the electorate (Ball 1987, p. 21), so that these members had to do little work in terms of rallying
support to get into parliament.
5The cost of registering supporters and opposing the registration of opponents’ supporters was associated
with the complex eligibility requirements. Political parties litigated against the inclusion of their opponents’
supporters and in defense of the inclusion of their own supporters.
3Framework
We study a model of collective decision-making in which each of a ﬁnite number of players
chooses whether or not to participate in the decision-making process, and if so which policy
to champion. We assume that the policy space is completely ordered (e.g. there is a single
issue, or many issues ordered lexicographically), and that the outcome is the median of the
policies championed by the participants.
We make two basic assumptions about the players’ payoﬀ functions, the ﬁrst of which
generalizes the idea that participation is costly.
C (costly participation) If a participant’s switching to nonparticipation does not change
the outcome, then her payoﬀ increases.
Our second basic assumption is that there are economies of party size. We study three
versions of this assumption, the most straightforward of which is tailored to our model of
committee decision-making.
E (economies of party size) If a participant’s switching to a larger party does not change
the median championed policy, then her payoﬀ increases.
Figure 1. An example in which a
player’s moving to a larger party
does not aﬀect the outcome.
Figure 1 gives an example in which a player’s switching to
a larger party does not aﬀect the median championed policy.
The horizontal line is the policy space; each dot represents
a player, its x-coordinate being the policy championed. The
vertical arrow points to the median policy championed, which
does not change if the player championing the policy on the far
left joins forces with the center-left player. Under assumption
E, this move increases the payoﬀ of the player on the far left.
We study two applications of our basic model. In the ﬁrst application, a decision is
to be made by a committee. Each player may participate and champion a policy, or not
participate; championing x entails a cost that declines with the total number of players
championing x. This model satisﬁes assumptions C and E.
In our second application, candidates ﬁrst choose positions; then citizens cast votes for
the candidates, and the resulting legislature chooses a policy. Taking the candidates to be
the players in our basic model, condition E may not be satisﬁed: a change in a candidate’s
position that does not aﬀect the median championed policy may change the outcome because
it changes the voters’ strategic incentives and thus the voting equilibrium, resulting in a
change in the set of candidates elected.
4Figure 2. An example in
which voters’ strategic incentives
change when a candidate’s posi-
tion changes.
In the top panel of Figure 2, citizens with favorite policies
on the right have an incentive to vote for the right (circled)
candidate, because if this candidate, in addition to the other
two, is elected, then the policy outcome is closer to their fa-
vorite positions than is the outcome if this candidate is not
elected. If, however, the left candidate moves to the center to
form a two-member party, as in the bottom panel, the out-
come is unaﬀected by the election of the right candidate, so
that citizens on the right have no incentive to vote for that
candidate.
The following variant of condition E accommodates this case.
PE (participation dependent economies of party size) If a participant’s switching to a larger
party (a) does not change the median championed policy and (b) would not change the
median championed policy if the action of any given other player were to be ﬁxed at
nonparticipation, then her payoﬀ increases.
In our two-stage game, condition (b) ensures that a candidate’s move does not aﬀect any
citizen’s incentive to vote. The left party’s move to the center in the example in Figure 2
does not satisfy it, because the move would change the outcome were the rightist not to
participate.
Figure 3. An example in which
a candidate’s incentives change
when another candidate changes
positions.
Condition PE is appropriate for a two-stage model in
which each candidate is committed to the policy she cham-
pions. In a model in which a legislator can renege on a com-
mitment to champion a policy, however, we need a version of
the condition that ensures that each legislator’s incentive to
maintain her position remains unchanged when another can-
didate changes position.
Consider the example in Figure 3, in which we take the
median of an even number of candidates’ positions to be the
average of the middle two positions. A move to the left party
by a member (say i) of the center-left party satisﬁes both (a)
and (b) of PE.
After i’s move, however, the remaining member of the
center-left party (say j) can, by changing her position, aﬀect the median position in ways
that she could not originally (assuming she remains elected). Speciﬁcally, after i’s move, j’s
5moving to the left moves the median to the left (assuming j remains elected), whereas prior
to i’s move, no move of j results in such a change in the median. Thus, depending on j’s
preferences, i’s move may give j an incentive to renege on j’s commitment to champion the
position of the center-left party. Consequently, i should be concerned that her move to the
left will precipitate an undesirable outcome-changing move to the left by her ex-comrade.
This consideration leads us to study the following condition, which is weaker than PE.
SE (strategy dependent economies of party size) If a participant’s switching to a larger
party (a) does not change the median championed policy and (b) does not allow any
other player, by changing her action, to induce outcomes that she could not induce
before the participant’s move, then her payoﬀ increases.
The move from the center-left party to the left party by player i that we considered in
Figure 3 does not satisfy (b) because after the move, the other member of the center-left
party can, by moving her position to the left, move the median championed policy to the
left, a change she cannot induce before i’s move.
Results
A key ﬁnding is that if participation is costly (C) and the game has participation depen-
dent economies of party size (PE), then exactly two parties form, and these parties are of
equal or almost equal size. In addition, up to three “independents” participate. If the game
satisﬁes the stronger condition of economies of party size (E), then at most two indepen-
dents participate. When participation is costly (C) and the game has strategy dependent
economies of party size (SE), then exactly two parties with more than two members form,
and these parties are of equal or almost equal size. In addition, up to three small parties or
independents participate (see Figure 4).
This two-party result is very general. It does not depend on the magnitude of the
economies of party size or sensitively on the nature of the individuals’ payoﬀs beyond con-
ditions C and E, PE, or SE. Thus the results in our applications do not depend sensitively
on the nature of the individuals’ preferences over policies; for example, we do not assume
these preferences are single-peaked.
The idea behind the result is straightforward. In deciding whether to participate in a
party or to champion a position as an individual, a player potentially faces a tradeoﬀ. Joining
a party saves her some cost, but may force her to compromise her position. However, if the
policy outcome is the median of the legislators’ proposed policies, then joining a party whose
6Odd number of participants
Even number of participants
The types of equilibria of a game satisfying C and E (Proposition 4.1)
The additional types of equilibria of a game satisfying C and PE (Proposition 4.2)
The additional types of equilibria of a game satisfying C and SE (Proposition 4.3)
Figure 4. The equilibria of a game satisfying C and E, PE, or SE. Agglomerations of four or more players
are parties, which may contain any number of players.
position is on the same side of the median as is her favorite position is just as eﬀective in
determining the outcome as is championing her own favorite position. Thus in fact the player
faces no tradeoﬀ. A left-leaning legislator is better oﬀ joining a left-leaning party than acting
as an independent, regardless of the size of the cost saving, and a right-leaning legislator is
better oﬀ joining a right-leaning party.
When we impose more structure on the players’ preferences, we can say more about
the equilibria. Speciﬁcally, assume that the payoﬀ of each player i to any action proﬁle a
takes the form v(M(a) − xi) − c(k(ai)) if she participates and v(M(a) − xi) if she does not,
where v is concave, v(z) = v(−z) for all z, M(a) is the median of the positions championed
by participants, k(ai) is the number of participants championing ai, and c is positive and
decreasing. (The policy xi is i’s favorite position.) Assume further that when the number
of participants is even, M(a) is the lottery that assigns probability 1
2 to each of the two
7central positions. We show that in every equilibrium in which there are two parties, with
positions say x and y > x, and no independents, there are positions ˆ x and ˆ y > ˆ x such that
the members of the party with position x are exactly the players whose favorite positions
are less than ˆ x and the members of the party with position y are exactly the players whose
favorite positions are greater than ˆ y. Interestingly, we may have x > ˆ x and y < ˆ y: every
participant’s favorite position may be more extreme than the position of the party to which
she belongs. (The positions have this property if the parties are relatively small and the cost
of running a small party is not too high.)
In the application of our results to a two-stage game in which players decide whether
to become candidates and then citizens cast votes that determine the composition of a
legislature (Section 6), we have to confront the possibility that a change in a candidate’s
position aﬀects the voting equilibrium in the subsequent subgame. We have argued that this
possibility means that the induced game between the candidates does not satisfy E. For it to
satisfy the weaker condition PE we need to restrict the way in which the voting equilibrium
changes when a candidate’s position changes. We assume that citizens do not change their
votes without good reason: if a voting equilibrium b remains an equilibrium after a deviation,
the outcome in the subgame following the deviation is b, even if other equilibria also exist.
Under this assumption we show that the induced game between the candidates satisﬁes C
and PE, so that in every equilibrium the candidates are grouped into two parties and/or up
to three independents.
Relation with literature
Both our model of committee voting and Feddersen’s (1992) voting model seek to explain
two-party competition. The models diﬀer in their explanatory variables. Feddersen’s model
emphasizes the role of voting decisions, while our model emphasizes the role of legislators.
Feddersen assumes that the outcome is the policy that obtains the most votes, an assumption
that captures well a single-district plurality rule election. By contrast, the median rule in
our model is an appropriate model of legislative compromise.
Feddersen’s ﬁrst-past-the-post outcome function leads immediately to the conclusion that
parties form in equilibrium. (Only a party can win an election.) His two-party result hinges
also on this outcome function; it depends in addition on an assumption about the distribution
of voters’ preferences (see his Proposition 4). Our result does not depend on any assumption
about the nature of preferences; it is driven by our assumptions of economies of party size
and the existence of a single issue.
8Gerber and Ortu˜ no-Ort´ ın (1998) study a model related to Feddersen’s, with a continuum
of voters. They assume a continuous outcome function that weights parties by their sizes
and gives proportionally larger weight to large parties. (Such a function is not consistent
with a winner-takes-all electoral rule.) They show that a unique strong Nash equilibrium
exists, in which there are two parties.
The model of Osborne, Rosenthal, and Turner (2000) is related to our example of com-
mittee decision-making with costly participation. The key respect in which their model
diﬀers from our application to committee voting lies in their assumption that each player’s
participation cost is independent of the other participants’ actions. Under this assumption,
a player’s strategy of proposing her favorite policy weakly dominates her other strategies, so
that there is no cost-based incentive for individuals with diﬀerent preferences to form parties.
In the equilibria of their model, moderates do not participate and participation in large pop-
ulations is low. The equilibria of our model, where the participation cost declines with the
number of individuals proposing a given policy, do not necessarily have these characteristics.
In particular, while equilibria may exist in which some moderates do not participate, there
also exist equilibria in which all individuals participate, even in large populations. Further,
in equilibrium two parties form.
Several other models generate parties from principles diﬀerent from those that drive the
application of our model to the electoral process. Morelli (2003), for example, studies a model
of party formation as an extensive game in which two potential candidates with extreme
preferences propose compromise positions to a moderate potential candidate; subsequently
each potential candidate chooses whether to stand, an election is held, and the outcome is
the median of the elected politicians’ positions. He ﬁnds that the number of parties depends
on the electoral system and the distribution of preferences. The primary role of parties in
his model is that they coordinate citizens’ votes in an election.
Baron (1993) studies a model of proportional representation within the Hotelling–Downs
framework. Citizens are not strategic, party formation is not costly, and the number of
parties is ﬁxed. Party size is determined by the fact that a large party has a diverse, and
thus harder to please, membership, whereas such a party is more likely to be part of the
government and be able to implement a policy appealing to its members.
Rivi` ere (2001) studies a variant of the citizen-candidate model with sincere voting in
which the role of a party is to share the cost of candidacy and inhibit competition between
candidates with similar preferences. Jackson and Moselle (2001) study a model of legislative
bargaining in which legislators can beneﬁt from forming parties that bind their members to
cooperate with each other in the bargaining. In Snyder and Ting’s (2002) model, parties
9are “brands” to imperfectly informed voters, aggregating ideologically similar candidates.
Levy (2004) models the idea that political parties increase the ability of candidates to commit
to policy positions. She ﬁnds that this increased ability aﬀects party formation only when
policies are multidimensional.
The ﬁrst part of Duverger’s Law, predicting two parties under a plurality system, is
given theoretical support by Cox (1987a) and Palfrey (1989) in a model in which strategic
voters elect a single representative. They formalize the idea that votes for candidates with
little chance of winning are wasted, resulting in equilibria in which there are two candidates.
Feddersen’s model, discussed above, also lends the ﬁrst part of the claim theoretical sup-
port, as do the “citizen-candidate” models of Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and
Coate (1997).
2. Model
Each member of a group I = {1,2,...,n} of people chooses whether to champion a policy,
and if so, which one. A policy is a member of the nonempty set X; the action of non-
participation is denoted θ. A person who champions a policy is called a participant. Each
person i’s payoﬀ function is ui: (X ∪ {θ})n → R.
If two or more people champion the same policy x ∈ X, we say that x is a party; if a
single person champions x, we say that x is an independent. We call a party with more than
two members a large party and one with exactly two members a small party.
The policy outcome is a compromise among the policies championed by participants: a
compromise function M : (X ∪ {θ})n → X assigns to each action proﬁle an outcome, with
M(θ,...,θ) (the outcome if no one participates) equal to some given default policy. We
assume throughout that the compromise function M is a variant of the median; we discuss
it in Section 3.
In summary, we study a strategic game in which the set of players is I = {1,...,n}, the set
of actions of each player is X∪{θ}, and the payoﬀ function of each player i is ui : (X∪{θ})n →
R. The relation between the actions and payoﬀs depends on the compromise function M, and
we denote the game Γ(I,(X ∪{θ})i∈I,(ui)i∈I,M); when there is no possibility for confusion
we use the abbreviation Γ(M).
We say that the game Γ(M) has costly participation if a player prefers to withdraw if
her withdrawal does not change the outcome.
Deﬁnition 2.1. For an action proﬁle a ∈ (X ∪ {θ})n the game Γ(M) has
10C costly participation at a if ui(θ,a−i) > ui(a) whenever ai ∈ X and M(a) = M(θ,a−i)
for any player i.
A game that has costly participation for every action proﬁle has costly participation.
Our assumptions about economies of party size are explained in the Framework section
of the Introduction. Here, and subsequently, we use #Z to denote the number of members
of the set Z.
Deﬁnition 2.2. For an action proﬁle a ∈ (X ∪ {θ})n the game Γ(M) has
E economies of party size at a if ui(x,a−i) > ui(a) whenever ai ∈ X, M(a) = M(x,a−i),
and #{j ∈ I : aj = ai} ≤ #{j ∈ I \ {i} : aj = x}
PE participation dependent economies of party size at a if ui(x,a−i) > ui(a) whenever
ai ∈ X, M(a) = M(x,a−i), M(θ,a−h) = M(θ,(x,a−i)−h) for each player h, and
#{j ∈ I : aj = ai} ≤ #{j ∈ I \ {i} : aj = x}
SE strategy dependent economies of party size at a if ui(x,a−i) > ui(a) whenever ai ∈ X,
M(a) = M(x,a−i), for any participating player h and any y ∈ X ∪ {θ} there exists
z ∈ X ∪ {θ} such that M(z,a−h) = M(y,(x,a−i)−h), and #{j ∈ I : aj = ai} ≤ #{j ∈
I \ {i} : aj = x}.
We say that a game that satisﬁes E for every action proﬁle has economies of party size, one
that satisﬁes PE for every action proﬁle has participation dependent economies of party size,
and one that satisﬁes SE for every action proﬁle has strategy dependent economies of party
size.
Examples
Example 2.1 (Committee voting). Each member of a committee of n people chooses
whether to champion a policy in X or not to participate. Each person i obtains the payoﬀ
vi(x) from the policy x, where vi : X → R; we refer to vi as i’s valuation function. If person i
participates and champions x she bears the cost ci(k(x)), where k(x) is the number of people
championing x and ci : N → R is positive and decreasing.






vi(M(a)) if ai = θ
vi(M(a)) − ci(#{j ∈ I : aj = ai}) if ai ∈ X.
11This game satisﬁes conditions C and E at every action proﬁle: participation is costly and
the game has economies of party size.
We may generalize this example by allowing each person’s cost of championing a policy
to depend on the policies championed by others, not simply on the number of other people
championing it. This generalization captures the idea that arguing the case for a policy may
be more diﬃcult if it is extreme, or if some other particularly attractive position is being
championed. The resulting game also satisﬁes C and E.
Example 2.2 (Elections without commitment). Consider a two-stage game in which
the players consist of both citizens and candidates for a legislature. In the ﬁrst stage each
citizen votes for a candidate; these decisions are made simultaneously. The set of winners of
the election is determined by an arbitrary rule. (For example, the set of winners may consist
of the top k vote-getters, with ties broken randomly.) In the second stage, each legislator
chooses whether to actively participate, incurring an eﬀort cost, and if so which policy to
champion. (A politician cannot commit to a policy prior to the election.) We assume that
the eﬀort cost displays economies of party size. As before, the policy outcome is the median
of the policies championed by the legislators. Both and citizens and politicians care about
this policy outcome. (In particular, the politicians are “ideological”.)
More precisely, the players in the subgame following any ﬁrst-period history are the
elected legislators, and the subgame has the form of the game in Example 2.1. Thus each
subgame satisﬁes C and E. Implicit in the game is the assumption that the electorate
knows the preferences of each politician and thus can anticipate the behavior of the elected
legislators in each subgame.
Proposition 4.2 below implies that in every subgame the politicians form two parties.
(Thus under plurality rule with ties broken randomly, every realization of the legislature
contains two parties.)
Example 2.3 (Elections with commitment). Now consider a model that allows a richer
interaction between voters and candidates, and permits candidates who are not ideological.
The electoral process has two stages.
• First, each potential legislator chooses whether to become a candidate, and if so the
policy she commits to champion.
• Second, each citizen chooses whether to vote for a candidate, and if so, which one.
An electoral rule determines the members of the legislature. The policy outcome is the
median of the policies championed by the elected candidates.
12Each citizen cares about the policy outcome and incurs a ﬁxed cost if she votes. Each
potential legislator incurs a cost if she participates as a candidate and may or may not care
about the policy outcome. If elected she obtains a “prize” that compensates her for the
costs; this prize depends on the number of elected legislators who propose the same policy
(i.e. on the size of her party after the election). This prize could reﬂect public subsidies to
parties or a lower cost of running for a member of a larger party.
We study this game in detail in Section 6. Fix a subgame perfect equilibrium and consider
the strategic game in which the players are the potential legislators and the payoﬀ of each
legislator to the action proﬁle a of policy commitments is her equilibrium payoﬀ in the
subgame following a. We show in Proposition 6.1 that this strategic game satisﬁes C (costly
participation) and PE (participation dependent economies of party size) under a natural
reﬁnement of subgame perfection that we call subgame persistence.
We consider a modiﬁcation of the game in which any elected legislator may change her
position after the election—i.e. may renege on her policy commitment. We propose an
alterative reﬁnement of subgame perfection, which takes into account incentive compatibility
requirements in subgames, and show that the associated strategic game between the potential
legislators satisﬁes C and SE (Proposition 6.3).
Example 2.4 (Proportional representation with party lists). The previous example
can be specialized to proportional representation based on party lists (the electoral system in
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland).
Candidates proposing the same position are ordered into a party-list and each citizen votes
for one of these lists. Each list is awarded a number of seats in proportion to the votes
received. Each action proﬁle in the two-stage game of the previous example corresponds to
an action proﬁle in this party-list model, with the same payoﬀs, and vice versa. Thus the
results for the previous example apply also to this example.
3. The compromise
We assume that the set X of policies is “completely ordered”. That is, the members of X are
related by an ordering, denoted ≤,6 which we interpret as embodying the policies’ positions
on a left–right political spectrum. That is, if x < y then all players agree that x is more
left than y, and if x ≤ y then they agree that x is at least as left as y. The members of X
6That is, ≤ is transitive, complete (either x ≤ y or y ≤ x for any two policies x ∈ X and y ∈ X), reﬂexive
(x ≤ x), and antisymmetric (x ≤ y and y ≤ x, implies x = y).
13may be numbers, in which case ≤ may take its usual meaning, but they may alternatively
be points in a higher-dimensional space, as long as they may be ordered.
We assume that the compromise is the median of the policies championed by participants.
When the number of participants is odd, the median is the middle proposed policy; when
no player participates, it a default outcome d ∈ X. When the number of participants is
even, we generally take the median to be a policy between the two middle positions; for our
committee example (Section 5) we assume instead, for convenience, that the median is a
50–50 lottery between the two middle positions.
Precisely, for any action proﬁle a, order the participants (the players i for whom ai ∈ X)
so that a1 ≤ ··· ≤ ak. If k is odd, the median of a is m(a) = a(k+1)/2. If k is positive and
even, the left median of a is ml(a) = ak/2 and the right median of a is mr(a) = ak/2+1. We
assume that the outcome M(a) is given by
M(a) =

   
   
d if a = (θ,...,θ)
m(a) if #{i ∈ I : ai ∈ X} is odd
S(ml(a),mr(a)) if #{i ∈ I : ai ∈ X} is positive and even.
Unless otherwise stated, we assume that for any x ∈ X and y ∈ X we have S(x,y) ∈ X,
with S(x,y) = S(y,x), and x ≤ S(x,y) ≤ y if x ≤ y. In Section 5 we assume instead that
S(x,y) is the lottery that assigns probability 1
2 to x and probability 1
2 to y.
The median championed policy is not beaten by any policy in pairwise voting when each
participant’s preferences are single-peaked (relative to the ordering of X) with a peak at
the policy she champions. The understanding underlying our outcome function is that a
player’s championing a policy x entails her committing to vote according to a single-peaked
preference that peaks at x.
4. Properties of equilibrium
We study the properties of a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium of a game satisfying our
conditions.
Proposition 4.1. At any Nash equilibrium in which participation is positive and C and E
are satisﬁed, one of the following conditions holds.
a. The number of participants is odd and there is either a single independent or two
equal-sized parties between which there is an independent.
14b. The number of participants is even, and there are (i) two equal-sized parties and no
independents, (ii) two independents, (iii) two equal-sized parties between which there
are two independents, or (iv) two parties, one larger by one member than the other,
between which there is a single independent.
This result and all subsequent ones are proved in the appendix. The proof rests on two
main ideas. First, if there are two parties on one side of the median, then any member of
the smaller party (or of either party, if the sizes are the same) can switch to the other party
without aﬀecting the outcome. Such a move is proﬁtable by condition E. Second, if a single
position is proposed and more than one player proposes it, then no player’s withdrawal aﬀects
the outcome. Therefore, by condition C some participating player can proﬁtably withdraw.
When the weaker condition PE is satisﬁed, three further types of equilibria may occur.
Proposition 4.2. Any Nash equilibrium in which participation is positive and C and PE
are satisﬁed either takes one of the forms given in Proposition 4.1 or has an odd number of
participants and (i) three independents, (ii) two equal-sized parties and three independents
holding positions between the parties, or (iii) two parties, one larger by one member, and
two independents holding positions between the parties.
Under the even weaker condition SE we get only an additional three new types of equi-
libria.
Proposition 4.3. Any Nash equilibrium in which participation is positive and C and SE
are satisﬁed either takes one of the forms given in Proposition 4.2 or has an even number
of participants and (i) two large parties of equal size and two small parties holding positions
between the large parties, (ii) two large parties, one larger than the other by two members,
and one small party holding a position between the large parties, or (iii) two large parties, one
larger than the other by one member, and a small party and an independent holding positions
between the large parties with the independent holding a position closer to the largest party.
5. A characterization of equilibrium in committee voting
For the game of committee voting in Example 2.1 in which the players’ valuation functions
are symmetric and strictly concave and their cost functions are all the same, we may fully
characterize the equilibria in which there are two parties and no independents, which we
refer to as two-party equilibria. We do so under the assumptions that no two players have
the same favorite position and that when the number of participants is even the outcome is
the lottery that assigns probability 1
2 to each median.
15Precisely, we make the following assumption.
A The policy space X is the real line R, each player i has a favorite position xi, and no
two players have the same favorite position. The valuation function of each player i is
given by vi(x) = v(x − xi), where v : R → R is decreasing and strictly concave on R+,
v(z) = v(−z) for all z, each player’s cost function ci is the same (denoted c), and for
all x ∈ X and y ∈ X with x < y, the outcome S(x,y) (the compromise when the left




Under this assumption, a two-party equilibrium may be constructed as follows (refer to
Figure 5). Number the players in order of their favorite positions: x1 < x2 < ··· < xn.
Choose an integer k with 2 ≤ k ≤ 1
2n. We construct an action proﬁle a∗ in which there are
two parties, each with k members. The parties’ positions are symmetric with respect to xk
and xn−k+1; we denote them xk+t∗ and xn−k+1−t∗. Players 1, ..., k belong to the party with
position xk + t∗ and players n − k + 1, ..., n belong to the party with position xn−k+1 − t∗.
The amount by which player k’s expected payoﬀ exceeds her payoﬀ when she switches to
nonparticipation is 1
2[v(t) + v((xn−k+1 − t) − xk)] − c(k) − v((xn−k+1 − t) − xk), or 1
2[v(t) −
v(xn−k+1 −xk −t)]−c(k). Deﬁne the function g on [−∞, 1
2(xn−k+1 −xk)) by g(t) = 1
2[v(t)−
v(xn−k+1 − xk − t)]. We have g(1
2(xn−k+1 − xk)) = 0; the strict concavity of v implies
that g is decreasing. Thus for any value of c(k) there exists a value t∗ of t such that
player k is indiﬀerent between remaining in the party with position xk +t∗ and switching to
nonparticipation. Given the symmetry of v and of the parties’ positions, for the same value
t∗ player n − k + 1 is indiﬀerent between remaining in the party with position xn−k+1 − t∗
and switching to nonparticipation. Let x = xk + t∗ and y = xn−k+1 − t∗. (Note that x < y.)
The strict concavity of v implies that players 1, ..., k − 1 prefer to remain in party x than
to switch to nonparticipation, and players n − k, ..., n prefer to remain in party y than to
switch to nonparticipation.
For the action proﬁle a∗ to be a Nash equilibrium, players k + 1, ..., n − k, who do not
participate, must be no better oﬀ participating in either of the parties. By an argument
similar to the one in the previous paragraph, this condition is equivalent to the conditions
1
2[v(x − xk+1) − v(y − xk+1)] ≤ c(k + 1) (1)
1
2[v(xn−k − y) − v(xn−k − x)] ≤ c(k + 1). (2)
If, in addition, no player is better oﬀ becoming an independent, a∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
This condition is satisﬁed if c(1) is large enough.










Figure 5. The determination of the party positions x and y, given k, for two cost functions. (We have
x = xk + t∗ and y = xn−k+1 − t∗; t∗ > 0 in the left panel and t∗ < 0 in the right panel.)
In this construction, players k and n−k+1 are indiﬀerent between remaining in their par-
ties and switching to nonparticipation. This indiﬀerence is not necessary for an equilibrium,
which requires only that these players not be better oﬀ by switching to nonparticipation.
Equivalently,
1
2[v(x − xk) − v(y − xk)] ≥ c(k) (3)
1
2[v(xn−k+1 − y) − v(xn−k+1 − y)] ≥ c(k). (4)
We may argue also that any equilibrium takes the form of a∗. The key point is that the
concavity of v implies that if, in a two-party equilibrium with parties x and y > x, player i
belongs to party x then every player j with j < i also belongs to x.
A precise result follows.
Proposition 5.1. Assume A. The action proﬁle a is a two-party Nash equilibrium if and





x if i = 1,...,k
θ if i = k + 1,...,k − n
y if i = k − n + 1,...,n,
x, y, and k satisfy (1), (2), (3), and (4), c(1)−c(k) ≥ max{−1
2v(xk−x),−1
2v(y−xn−k+1)},
and c(1) ≥ −1
2[v(xi − x) + v(y − xi)] for i = k + 1 and i = n − k.
Typically, equilibria exist with various values of the common party size k: a range of
party sizes is compatible with equilibrium. In equilibria in which k is small, the parties’
positions are relatively far apart, as in the right panel of Figure 5. Note that if c(k) is small
enough (as in the left panel of the ﬁgure), in some equilibria each party’s position is more
moderate than the favorite positions of all the party’s members.
176. Elections with commitment
In Example 2.3, each of a ﬁnite number n of potential legislators may vie for a place in
a legislative assembly. Candidates are elected to the assembly by a population of citizens,
modelled as a ﬁnite positive atomless measure space (Ω,F,µ). (We adopt this formulation to
avoid integer problems.) The electoral process has two stages. First, each potential legislator
chooses whether to become a candidate, and if so which policy (member of X) to champion.
Second, each citizen chooses whether to vote for a candidate, and if so, which one.
In the subgame following the potential legislators’ action proﬁle a ∈ (X ∪{θ})n, a voting
proﬁle for the citizens is a measurable function
b
a : Ω → {i ∈ I : ai ∈ X} ∪ {θ},
where ba(ω) = θ means that citizen ω does not vote and ba(ω) = i means she votes for
candidate i ∈ I (who proposes the policy ai ∈ X).
Electoral rule An electoral rule translates the voting proﬁle into a subset of the candidates
(those who are elected). We work here with rules that elect a potential legislator if and only
if the number of votes she obtains is at least equal to some “quota” of votes. This quota
is given by a quota function Q: Rn
+ → R+ that is continuous, nondecreasing (x ≥ y implies
Q(x) ≥ Q(y)), anonymous in the sense that for any one-to-one function λ : I → I we have
Q(α1,...,αn) = Q(αλ(1),...,αλ(n)), and vanishes, if at all, only at zero (Q(x) = 0 implies
x = 0). Given a proﬁle a of policies championed by the potential legislators and a voting
proﬁle ba, (ba)−1(j) is the set of citizens who vote for candidate j and µ((ba)−1(j)) is the size








The following three examples of quota functions are continuous, nondecreasing, and
anonymous. A potential legislator is elected if and only if she gets at least as many votes as
i. (ﬁrst-past-the-post) every other candidate: Q(α1,...,αn) = maxi∈I αi
ii. (Hare Quota) the total number of votes divided by k, the number of seats in the
legislature: Q(α1,...,αn) = (
Pn
i=1 αi)/k
iii. (ﬁxed quota) a ﬁxed number (which might be related to the size of the population):
Q(α) = δ for all α ∈ Rn.






ai if i is elected
θ otherwise.
Each citizen ω ∈ Ω attaches the value v(ω,x) to the policy x ∈ X, where v : Ω×X → R. We
refer to v(ω,·) as ω’s valuation function. We assume that the function v(·,x) is integrable
for any x.
A citizen who votes incurs the cost Cz > 0. The payoﬀ u(ω,(a,ba)) of citizen ω depends






v(ω,M(A(a,ba))) − Cz if ba(ω) 6= θ
v(ω,M(A(a,ba))) if ba(ω) = θ.
Each potential legislator i incurs the cost C` > 0 if she participates as a candidate and
has a valuation function vi : X → R over policies. If elected she obtains a “prize” that
depends on the number of elected legislators that propose the same policy (i.e. on the size




   
   
vi(M(A(a,ba))) if ai = θ
vi(M(A(a,ba))) − C` if ai 6= θ & i not elected
vi(M(A(a,ba))) − C` + Pi(a,ba) if ai 6= θ & i is elected,
where
Pi(a,b
a) = p(#{j ∈ I : Aj(a,b
a) = ai})
and p : N → R++ is a positive increasing function, called the prize function.
Equilibrium Given the continuum of voters, no single voter aﬀects the outcome of the elec-
tion. To obtain meaningful equilibria, we consider action proﬁles from which no arbitrarily
small group of citizens has an incentive to deviate.
Each action proﬁle a ∈ (X ∪ {θ})n of the potential legislators leads to a subgame Γa in
which the citizens vote. Given a voting proﬁle b in the subgame Γa and ² > 0, we say that a
measurable set S ⊂ Ω is an ²-club if S ⊂ b−1(j) for some j ∈ {i ∈ I : ai ∈ X} ∪ {θ} (either
all members of S vote for the same candidate, or none votes) and 0 < µ(S) ≤ ².
19Deﬁnition 6.1. The voting proﬁle b in the subgame Γa is a small clubs Nash equilibrium
(or simply an equilibrium) of the subgame if there exists ² > 0 such that for every ²-club







Notice that when Ω is ﬁnite and µ is the counting measure, the notion of a small clubs
Nash equilibrium coincides with the notion of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
A strategy proﬁle in the whole game is a pair (a,B) where a ∈ (X ∪ {θ})n and B is a
function that associates each a∗ ∈ (X ∪ {θ})n with a voting proﬁle B(a∗) : Ω → {i ∈ I :
a∗
i ∈ X}∪{θ} in the subgame Γa∗.7 For a strategy proﬁle (a,B) we say that there is positive
voter turnout if B(a) does not vanish almost everywhere.
For each action proﬁle B of the citizens deﬁne the strategic game for the legislators
G
B(I,(X ∪ {θ})i∈I,(wi)I∈I,M)
by letting wi(a) = ui(a,B(a)) for each a ∈ (X ∪ {θ})n and each i, where ui is the payoﬀ of
the potential legislator.
Each voting subgame Γa may have multiple equilibria, with a variety of outcomes. We
restrict attention to equilibria of the whole game in which each legislator expects a deviation
in the ﬁrst stage to have no eﬀect on the citizens’ voting behavior if this behavior remains an
equilibrium of the subgame reached after the deviation. We say that the subgames Γa∗ and
Γa are adjacent if there exists some player i and some x ∈ X ∪ {θ} such that a∗ = (x,a−i)
(i.e. the histories a and a∗ diﬀer only in the action of a single candidate).
Deﬁnition 6.2. A strategy proﬁle (a,B) is an equilibrium if a is a Nash equilibrium of
the game GB and the voting proﬁle B(a) is a small clubs Nash equilibrium of the subgame
following the history a. An equilibrium strategy proﬁle (a,B) is a subgame persistent equi-
librium if for every a∗ adjacent to a we have B(a∗) = B(a) whenever B(a) is a small clubs
Nash equilibrium of the subgame following a∗.
Results
Proposition 6.1. If (a,B) is a subgame persistent equilibrium with positive voter turnout,
then the game GB satisﬁes C and PE at a.
7We use the notation B(a∗) instead of ba
∗
to emphasize the ﬁxed action proﬁle B for the second stage of
the game.
20The next result is an immediate consequence of Propositions 4.2 and 6.1.
Corollary 6.2. In a subgame persistent equilibrium with positive voter turnout all partici-
pating candidates are elected and their positions are conﬁgured according to Proposition 4.2.
To see the logic behind the result, note ﬁrst that at equilibrium, the continuity of the
quota function and the fact that it is nondecreasing imply that all elected candidates get
exactly the quota of votes and candidates that are not elected get no votes. Therefore, by
subgame persistence any unelected candidate can proﬁtably drop out without aﬀecting the
policy outcome, so that all candidates at equilibrium get elected. To show that condition
C is satisﬁed at a, we note that if withdrawal does not change the outcome, a small club
of citizens voting for that candidate can proﬁtably drop out. To show that condition PE
is satisﬁed at a, we argue that if a move by candidate i to a larger party x satisﬁes the
conditions of PE, then the equilibrium voting proﬁle of the subgame following the history a
is also an equilibrium voting proﬁle of the adjacent subgame following the history (x,a−i).
The reason is that if the members of a small club of voters ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate in
the adjacent subgame, then they also ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate in the original subgame,
contradicting equilibrium. So by subgame persistence candidate i ﬁnds it proﬁtable to move
to the larger party x.
Incentive compatibility We now study the implications of allowing the candidates to renege
on their policy commitments. We look at equilibria that satisfy two conditions. First, no
elected legislator can proﬁtably change her policy after she has incurred the cost of par-
ticipation and obtained the “prize” that depends on the size of her party. Second, each
potential legislator expects a deviation in the ﬁrst stage to have no eﬀect on the citizens’
voting behavior if this behavior remains an equilibrium of the subgame reached after the de-
viation and no elected legislator wishes to renege on her policy commitment in this subgame.
By weakening the restriction on deviants’ beliefs about the resulting voting equilibrium, we
potentially allow beliefs for which deviations that were proﬁtable under subgame persistence
are no longer proﬁtable, and thus expand the set of equilibria.
Let b be a voting proﬁle for citizens in the subgame following a. We say that (a,b) is
incentive compatible if for any policy x ∈ X and for any elected legislator i in that subgame
we have
vi(M(A(a,b))) ≥ vi(M(x,A−i(a,b))),
where vi is i’s valuation function. That is, a voting proﬁle is incentive compatible for a
given strategy proﬁle for potential legislators if no elected legislator can proﬁtably change
21her policy after the election.
Deﬁnition 6.3. An equilibrium strategy proﬁle (a,B) is a subgame IC-persistent equilibrium
if (a,B(a)) is incentive compatible and for every a∗ adjacent to a we have B(a∗) = B(a)
whenever B(a) is a small clubs Nash equilibrium of the subgame following a∗ and (a∗,B(a))
is incentive compatible.
A subgame persistent equilibrium (a,B) may not be a subgame IC-persistent equilibrium,
because (a,B(a)) may not be incentive compatible. However,
(a,B) is subgame persistent and
(a,B(a)) is incentive compatible
⇒ (a,B) is subgame IC-persistent.
Further, a subgame IC-persistent equilibrium (a,B) may not be a subgame persistent equi-
librium, because at a∗ adjacent to a we may have B(a∗) 6= B(a) even though B(a) is a
small clubs Nash equilibrium of the subgame following a∗ (i.e. a voting proﬁle may remain
an equilibrium for an adjacent subgame but may no longer be incentive compatible.)
The next result follows easily from the proof of Proposition 6.1.
Proposition 6.3. If (a,B) is a subgame IC-persistent equilibrium with positive voter turnout,
then the game GB satisﬁes C and SE at a.
Corollary 6.4. In a subgame IC-persistent equilibrium with positive voter turnout, all partic-
ipating candidates get elected and their positions are conﬁgured according to Proposition 4.3.
The Hare Quota Consider brieﬂy the speciﬁc election rule given by the Hare Quota, whereby
a potential legislator is elected if and only if the number of votes she obtains is at least the
total number of votes divided by k, the number of seats in the legislature.
In this case, if candidates are not ideological then the conclusion of Proposition 6.1 holds
for subgame perfect equilibria. This result follows from the fact that for the Hare Quota,
in any equilibrium of a voting subgame with positive voter turnout exactly k legislators are
elected, each receiving exactly the Hare Quota of votes.
Another implication of this property is that the Hare Quota can be considered in the
class of the Single Transferable Vote (STV) procedures.8 At an equilibrium of our model
each elected legislator receives exactly the Hare Quota of votes. Therefore, this procedure
8In the canonical STV procedure if a candidate receives more than the quota of votes, then the excess
votes are transferred to another candidate, usually using the voters’ secondary preferences.
22provides transferability implicitly—if a candidate has enough votes to get elected, then in
equilibrium excess supporters allocate their votes to other candidates or drop out.9
Existence of equilibrium A subgame persistent equilibrium of the two-stage game exists
under weak conditions. If we assume, for example, that potential legislators are not ideo-
logical, citizens’ preferences are single-peaked, and the distribution of favorite positions is
nonatomic, then we can construct an equilibrium. For a small enough cost of participation,
we ﬁnd a two-party equilibrium in which all citizens vote, citizens whose favorite positions
are to the left of the population median vote for the left party, and those whose positions
are to the right of the population vote for the right party.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4.3 (SE). Let a be a Nash equilibrium with at least two participants.
Number of participants is even: Ignore nonparticipating players and re-index the par-
ticipants from −k to −1 and from 1 to k so that ai ≤ aj if i ≤ j, so that the left median is
a−1 and the right median is a1. In this proof we use a(I\i) to denote the list of actions of the
players other than i and a−i to denote the action of player −i.
We prove the result by establishing four properties of an equilibrium. (By the symmetry
of the situation we need only look at players with positive indexes.)
(i) a1 6= a−1: If a1 = a−1 and either player 1 or player −1 withdraws then the outcome
does not change, so by C the player’s withdrawal is proﬁtable, which is inconsistent with
equilibrium.
(ii) If i ≥ 3 and j ≥ 3, then ai = aj: Suppose by way of contradiction that ai 6= aj. Without
loss of generality, assume that aj is held by at least as many players as is ai. If player i
moves to aj, then the policy outcome does not change and she joins a larger party. (I.e. the
second and fourth conditions in SE are satisﬁed for x = aj.)
Now take a participating player h. If we ﬁx that player’s action at nonparticipation, the
new outcome becomes a1 or a−1 irrespective of player i’s move to the position of j. Further, if
9For a history of the STV procedure see Tideman (1995) and Richardson and Tideman (2000). One
of the earliest versions of STV voting was in a local election in Tasmania, Australia. In that election a
voter recorded his name on his preferred candidate’s list. A candidate secured election by receiving the
required number of votes. As in our model, Richardson and Tideman point out that this procedure provides
transferability implicitly, in that when a candidate had enough votes to be elected, supporters see this and
allocate their votes to other candidates.
23we ﬁx player h’s action to y ∈ X then the new outcome is the same before and after i moves
to aj, because the positions of player 2 and all players to the left of her remain unchanged
with i’s move. That is, M(y,(aj,a(I\i))(I\h)) = M(y,a(I\h)). Thus by SE, player i’s move to
aj is proﬁtable, which is inconsistent with equilibrium.
(iii) Players 2 is not an independent: Suppose by way of contradiction that player 2 is an
independent. Then by (i) player 1 is also an independent. Now if 2 shifts her position
to 1, then she joins a two member party and does not change the outcome. Take some
participating player h and ﬁx her position to y ∈ X ∪ {θ}. Notice that when M(y,a(I\h)) 6=
M(y,(a1,a(I\2))(I\h)), we have M(y,(a1,a(I\2))(I\h)) = a1. Therefore, letting z = a1 we have
M(z,a(I\h)) = M(y,(a1,a(I\2))(I\h)), so that by SE player 2’s move to a1 is proﬁtable, which
is inconsistent with equilibrium.
(iv) If a2 6= a3 then player 3 is a member of a party with three or more members: Suppose
that a2 6= a3 and that a3 is held by two members or an independent. By (iii), players 1 and
2 are members of one party. Now by the same argument as for (ii), the conditions of SE
are satisﬁed for i = 3 and x = a2, so that a move by player 3 to a2 is proﬁtable, which is
inconsisent with equilibrium.
Number of participants is odd: Re-index the participants from −k to k with ai ≤ aj
if i ≤ j, so that the median position is a0.
(i) Player 0 is an independent: If not, the withdrawal of any player whose position is a0
does not change the outcome, so that by C it is proﬁtable, which is inconsistent with with
equilibrium.
(ii) If i ≥ 2 and j ≥ 2, then ai = aj: Suppose by way of contradiction that ai 6= aj. Without
loss of generality, assume that aj is held by at least as many players as is ai. If player i
moves to aj then the policy outcome does not change and she joins a larger party. (I.e. the
second and fourth conditions in SE are satisﬁed for x = aj.) Now take some participating
player h and ﬁx her position to x ∈ X ∪ {θ}. Then M(x,(ai,a(I\j))(I\h)) = M(x,a(I\h)), so
by SE the move to aj is proﬁtable, which is inconsistent with equilibrium.
(iii) If i ≥ 2, then i is not an independent: If i is an independent, then by (i) player 1 is an
independent and by the same argument as in (ii) player i can proﬁtably move to a1.
Proof of Proposition 4.2 (PE). Let a be a Nash equilibrium. PE implies SE, so we need
only exclude as an equilibrium an action proﬁle with an even number of participants in which
a two member party holds the right median position and there is a three or more member
party to its right.
24Once again re-index the participants from −k to k, excluding 0, with ai ≤ aj if i ≤ j.
Reconsider case (iv) of the proof of Proposition 4.3.
(iv’) Players 2 and 3 cannot hold diﬀerent positions: If a2 6= a3 and player 2 moves to a3
then she joins a larger party and does not change the outcome. Fixing the action of some
player h to be nonparticipation, we know that M(θ,a(I\h)) is a1 if h < 0 and a−1 if h > 0.
Therefore M(θ,(a3,a(I\2))(I\h)) = M(θ,a(I\h)), so that PE implies that player 2’s move to
a3 is proﬁtable.
Proof of Proposition 4.1 (E). Let a be a Nash equilibrium. E implies PE, which implies
SE, so we need only exclude as an equilibrium an action proﬁle with an odd number of
participants in which an independent holds a position other than the median. Such an action
proﬁle is excluded as an equilibrium because the median position is held by an independent
in any equilibrium with an odd number of participants, so that any other independent can
proﬁtably move to the median, given E.
Proof of Proposition 5.1. We ﬁrst show that an action proﬁle that satisﬁes the conditions
in the result is a Nash equilibrium. Consider such an action proﬁle. By (3), player k is
not better oﬀ switching to nonparticipation. Given |x − xk| > |y − xk|, she is also not
better oﬀ switching to party y: if she does so then the outcome changes to y from the 50–50
lottery between y and x and her cost of participation falls from c(k) to c(k + 1). By the
strict concavity of v, these two conclusions apply to players 1, ..., k − 1. Further, by the
symmetry of v, the symmetry of the parties’ positions, and (4), these conclusions apply to
players n−k+1, ..., n. By (1) and (2), players k+1, ..., n−k are not better oﬀ switching
to participation in either party.
It remains to argue that no player is better oﬀ becoming an independent. First consider
the case in which xk ≤ x.
• Suppose xi ≤ xk. Then i is a member of x and her switching to run as an independent
either has no eﬀect on the outcome or, if the position she chooses exceeds x, makes the
outcome worse for her.
• Suppose xk < xi ≤ x. Then i does not participate. If she switches to running as an
independent, the best outcome she can induce is x (which she induces by choosing any
position of at most x). She can induce the same outcome by joining party x, which is
less costly than running as an independent, so she cannot proﬁtably switch to running
as an independent.
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an independent is xi, in which case the outcome changes to xi. Given the concavity of
v, the player who has most to gain from such a deviation is one for whom xi is closest
to x. Now, a player whose favorite position is x does not gain by joining x, and hence
deﬁnitely does not gain from becoming an independent. Thus i does not gain from
becoming an independent.
If x < xk, we argue as follows.
• Suppose xi ≤ x. Then i is a member of x and her switching to run as an independent
either has no eﬀect on the outcome or, if the position she chooses exceeds x, makes the
outcome worse for her.
• Suppose x < xi ≤ xk. Then i is a member of x. If she switches to running as an
independent, the best outcome she can induce is a 50–50 lottery between xi and y
(which she induces by choosing the position xi). The player who has most to gain
from such a deviation is k. For this player not to gain from such a deviation we need
1
2[v(0) + v(y − xk)] − c(1) ≤ 1
2[v(xk − x) + v(y − xk)] − c(k),
or
c(1) − c(k) ≥ −1
2v(xk − x).
• Suppose xk < xi. Then i does not participate. The best position for her to choose as
an independent is xi, in which case the outcome changes to xi. Given the concavity
of v, the player who has most to gain from such a deviation is player k + 1. For this
player not to gain from such a deviation we need
c(1) ≥ −1
2[v(xk+1 − x) + v(y − xk+1)]
Again by the symmetry of v and of the parties’ positions, the conditions in the result
imply that players n − k + 1, ..., n are not better oﬀ becoming independents. Hence an
action proﬁle that satisﬁes the conditions in the result is a Nash equilibrium.
We now show that any two-party equilibrium satisﬁes the conditions in the result. Con-
sider such an equilibrium. By Proposition 4.1 the parties have the same number of members.
Denote their positions by x and y > x and the number of members in each party by k.
Suppose that player i belongs to party y, where |y − xi| > |x − xi|. If she switches to
party x the outcome changes to x from the 50–50 lottery between x and y and her cost of
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does not participate or belongs to the party whose position is closer to xi.
Denote the party to which player i belongs by x. Then 1
2[v(x − xi) − v(y − xi)] ≥ c(k).
We argue that in any equilibrium every player j with j < i also belongs to party x. If such a
player j does not belong to party x then she does not participate (by the previous argument),
and by joining x she changes the payoﬀ from 1
2[v(x−xj)+v(y−xj)] to v(x−xj)−c(k+1).
Given the strict concavity of v, the fact that c is decreasing, and the fact that k is not better
oﬀ leaving party x, this change is positive.
Hence in any equilibrium in which each party has k members, players 1, ..., k belong to
party x, players k + 1, ..., n − k do not participate, and players n − k + 1, ..., n belong to
party y. Because player k is a member of party x, (3) is satisﬁed, and symmetrically (4) is
satisﬁed. Because players k + 1 and n − k do not participate, (1) and (2) are satisﬁed.
Finally, the arguments in the ﬁrst part of the proof establish that for no player to have
an incentive to become an independent, the conditions in the last part of the result must be
satisﬁed.
Proof of Proposition 6.1. Given positive voter turnout, the quota q is positive.
We ﬁrst show that no unelected candidate receives votes. Suppose to the contrary that
candidate i is not elected and obtains a positive measure of votes. Let δ ∈ (0,q) be the
largest measure of votes received by any unelected candidate. Because the quota function
is continuous and nondecreasing and Ω is atomless, there exists ² > 0 such that the quota
remains in (δ,q] if an ²-club of citizens voting for i switches to not voting. Thus these citizens’
withdrawal does not aﬀect the set of elected candidates and hence the policy outcome. The
members of the ²-club decrease their costs, however, contradicting the fact that B(a) is an
equilibrium of the subgame following a. Thus no unelected candidate receives votes.
We now show that every candidate is elected. We argue that an unelected candidate
who drops out does not aﬀect the outcome, and hence increases her payoﬀ. Suppose that
candidate i is not elected. Then by the previous paragraph she receives no votes. We show
that the voting equilibrium B(a) of the subgame Γa in which i is a candidate is also an
equilibrium of the adjacent subgame Γ(θ,a−i) in which i is not a candidate. Because B(a) is
an equilibrium of Γa we know that there exists ² > 0 such that no ²-club has an incentive
to deviate from B(a) in this subgame. Choose ν ∈ (0,min{²,q}). For ν small enough, when
a ν-club changes its action from B(a) in the subgame Γa, candidate i remains unelected,
because the quota remains positive. Therefore, if the ν-club changes its action from B(a) in
the subgame Γ(θ,a−i), the change in the policy outcome is the same as it is in the subgame
27Γa. Consequently, if some ν-club can proﬁtably change its vote in the subgame Γ(θ,a−i), then
it can also proﬁtably change its vote in the subgame Γa. Thus B(a) is an equilibrium of the
subgame Γ(θ,a−i); subgame persistence implies that B(a) = B(θ,a−i). Therefore, candidate
i’s dropping out reduces her costs, and does not change the policy outcome, contradicting
the fact that (a,B) is an equilibrium. Hence all candidates are elected.
The game GB satisﬁes C at a. Condition C is satisﬁed if we show that there exists
no candidate i for whom M(θ,a−i) = M(a). Assume the contrary. We know that the
quota is positive and that candidate i, who is elected, gets some votes. However, given
M(θ,a−i) = M(a), any small club voting for i can proﬁtably withdraw and reduce its cost
without changing the policy outcome: after its withdrawal the quota does not go up and all
candidates (with the possible exception of i) remain elected. This contradicts the fact that
B(a) is an equilibrium of the subgame Γa.
The game GB satisﬁes PE at a. First notice that in an equilibrium all candidates
get exactly the quota of votes, because otherwise some ²-club voting for a candidate can
proﬁtably drop out without changing the election outcome. Thus the policy outcome after
the election is M(a).
Now, PE is satisﬁed if there exists no candidate i and policy x ∈ X with x 6= ai such
that
• M(a) = M(x,a−i)
• M(θ,a−j) = M(θ,(x,a−i)−j) for each player j
• #{j ∈ I \ {i} : aj = ai} < #{j ∈ I \ {i} : aj = x}.
Assume that the conditions hold for elected candidate i. We show that i can proﬁtably
move to x, contradicting the fact that (a,B) is an equilibrium.
For any history a∗, denote the set of small clubs Nash equilibria of Γa∗ by β(a∗).
Our strategy is to show that B(a) ∈ β(x,a−i), which by subgame persistence implies
that B(x,a−i) = B(a). This is because candidate i ﬁnds it proﬁtable to switch to the policy
x, increase her prize, and not change the electoral or policy outcomes.
So to complete the proof we prove that B(a) ∈ β(x,a−i). Suppose that the citizens use
the strategy B(a) in the subgame following (x,a−i). We argue that no ²-club can proﬁtably
deviate from B(a).
If an ²-club voting for some legislator j stops voting, then j is no longer elected whereas all
other participating legislators are still elected. But we know that M(θ,a−j) = M(θ,(x,a−i)−j),
28so if this ²-club can proﬁtably drop out when the action proﬁle is B(a) in the subgame follow-
ing (x,a−i), then it can proﬁtably drop out when the action proﬁle is B(a) in the subgame
following a, contradicting B(a) ∈ β(a).
If an ²-club voting for some legislator j switches to voting for legislator j0, then because all
candidates get exactly the quota of votes, one of the following cases occurs in the subgames
following a and (x,a−i): 1) only candidate j0 remains elected, 2) all candidates except j are
elected, 3) no candidate remains elected, 4) all candidates remain elected.
In no case is the deviation proﬁtable for the ²-club in the subgame following a, because
(a,B) is an equilibrium. Therefore case 1 for j0 6= i, and cases 2, 3, and 4 are not proﬁtable in
the subgame following (x,a−i), because they result in the same change in the policy outcome
for both subgames. For case 1 with j0 = i, there exists another candidate h holding position
x. If in the subgame Γ(x,a−i) the ²-club can proﬁtably switch its vote from j to i, then (given
the anonymity of the quota function) in the subgame Γa it can proﬁtably switch from j to
h, which contradicts equilibrium.
A similar argument shows that an ²-club that does not vote cannot proﬁtably vote for
any candidate j in the Γ(x,a−i), because such a change does not decrease the quota and either
only candidate j remains elected or all candidates remain elected.
The previous paragraphs imply that for some ² > 0 the members of no ²-club can prof-
itably change their vote from B(a) in the subgame following (x,a−i).
Proof of Proposition 6.3. We know from the proof of Proposition 6.1 that all elected candi-
dates get the quota of votes and unelected candidates get no votes.
We need to show that all candidates are elected. Suppose by way of contradiction that
candidate i is not elected. We know from the proof of Proposition 6.1 that B(a) ∈ β(θ,a−i).
Furthermore, (a,B) is incentive compatible, so ((θ,a−i),B) is incentive compatible because
i is not elected. Therefore by subgame IC-persistence we have B(θ,a−i) = B(a) and i ﬁnds
it proﬁtable to withdraw. Thus all candidates are elected.
The rest of the proof follows with little modiﬁcation from the proof of Proposition 6.1.
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